Rethinking Construction Cost Overruns: Cognition, Learning and Estimation by Ahiaga-Dagbui, Dominic & Smith, Simon
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rethinking Construction Cost Overruns: Cognition, Learning and
Estimation
Citation for published version:
Ahiaga-Dagbui, D & Smith, S 2014, 'Rethinking Construction Cost Overruns: Cognition, Learning and
Estimation' Journal of Financial Management of Property and Construction, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 38-54.
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Early version, also known as pre-print
Published In:
Journal of Financial Management of Property and Construction
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
For Peer Review
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rethinking Construction Cost Overruns: Cognition, Learning 
and Estimation 
 
 
Journal: Journal of Financial Management of Property and Construction 
Manuscript ID: JFMPC-06-2013-0027 
Manuscript Type: Research Paper 
Keywords: 
Cost Overruns, Optimism Bias, Strategic Misrepresentation, Data Mining, 
Dunning-Kruger Effects, Prospect Theory 
  
 
 
Journal of Financial Management of Property and Construction
For Peer Review
INTRODUCTION 
Cost performance on a construction project remains one of the main measures of the success 
of a construction project (Atkinson, 1999; Chan and Chan, 2004). Reliable estimates are 
important for several reasons- for organisational budgeting purposes, for loan application if 
project has to be funded through credit facilities, to estimate their likely cost of financing 
loans (interest payments), for estimate commercial feasibility or viability of the project, etc. 
The present economic meltdown also imposes a parsimonious approach to spending on most 
organisations and governments. However, estimating the final cost of construction projects 
can be extremely difficult due to the complex web of cost influencing factors that need to be 
considered- type of project, material costs, likely design and scope changes, ground 
conditions, duration, size of project, type of client, tendering method- the list is endless 
(Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith, 2012). Trying to work out the cost influence of most of these 
variables at the inception stage of a project where cost targets are set can be an exhaustive 
task, if not at all futile. Ignoring most of them altogether creates a perfect recipe for future 
cost overruns, disputes, law suits and even project termination in some cases. Even more, 
there is a high level of uncertainty around most of these factors at the initial stages of the 
project as noted by  Jennings (2012). 
Error! Reference source not found. shows major public projects that have experienced significant 
cost growth. Flyvbjerg et al. (2004) report that 9 out 10 infrastructure projects overrun their 
budgets and that infrastructure project have an 86% likelihood of exceeding their budgets. 
The on-going Edinburgh Trams project has already far exceeded its initial budget leading to 
significant scope reduction to curtail the ever-growing cost (Miller, 2011; Railnews, 2012). 
The recent 2012 London Olympics bid was awarded at circa £2.4 billion in 2005. This was 
adjusted to about £9.3 billion in 2007 after significant scope changes. The project was 
completed at £8.9 billion in 2010 (Gidson, 2012; NAO, 2012). These statistics have often led 
to extensive claims, disputes and lawsuits in some cases within the industry (Love et al., 
2010).  
[Table 1 here] 
Cost overrun in the construction industry has been attributed to a number of sources including 
technical error in design or estimation, managerial incompetency, risk and uncertainty to 
suspicions of foul play, deception and delusion, and even corruption. A recent debate on the 
Construction Network of Building Researchers (CNBR) on whether or not construction cost 
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overruns could be attributed to error in estimation or lies by project sponsors and estimators 
left many trailing questions than answers (See the November 2012 CNBR archive online) - 
How accurate or reliable can cost estimates be? What is the best measure of cost overrun? 
Might there be a need to change how cost performance is measured at present? Should the 
estimator be absolved of the responsibility of producing reasonably accurate estimates? 
Should the industry even bother about cost overruns at all if project goals are met in the long 
run? 
While drawing on the works of some of the contemporary authorities on the subject, different 
schools of thought on causes of construction cost overruns have been synthesized in this 
paper to provide a coherent and holistic view of the problem.  Recurring themes have been 
expanded upon, challenging traditional paradigms of assessing cost performance on 
construction projects while offering emerging frameworks of reckoning cost growth. It is 
proposed that there is a conflation of two quite different causes of cost growth: cost under-
estimation and cost over-run. The paper then presents the development of cost model using 
data mining. It is hoped that data mining might be one of the possible avenues for alleviating 
the problem of project cost overruns within the construction. 
SOURCES OF COST GROWTH 
Causes of cost growth have been attributed to several sources including improperly managed 
risk and uncertainty (Okmen and Öztas, 2010), scope creep (Love et al., 2011; Gil and 
Lundrigan, 2012), optimism bias (Lovallo and Kahneman, 2003; Jennings, 2012) to 
suspicions of foul-play and corruption (Wachs, 1990; Flyvbjerg, 2009).  While not attempting 
to provide a definitive list of all possible sources, this section of the paper provides a 
synthesis of the mainstream arguments on the causes of cost growth, drawing particularly on 
the works of some of the contemporary authorities on the subject to provide a holistic view 
on the subject. 
Risk and Uncertainty 
The nature of a construction project makes it particularly prone to the effects of risk and 
uncertainty- its complex and dynamic; each project has many parties with business and 
project objectives; projects are exposed to the weather (not in a controlled environment), 
project duration typically spreads over several years before completion, etc. It is no surprise 
then that risk, simply defined here as the measure of exposure to financial loss, or gain 
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(Akintoye, 2000), has been heavily cited as one of the main causes of failure to meet cost 
targets on construction projects (Skitmore and Ng, 2003; Öztas, 2004; Okmen and Öztas, 
2010). Arguably, the construction industry is perhaps one of the most risk prone industries 
with project cost being one of main areas susceptible to its effects. Almost all types of risk 
(including scope changes, inclement weather, unsuitable ground conditions, disputes, client’s 
cash flow problems, etc) bear some form of financial ramifications.   
As noted by Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith (2012), effective cost planning relates the design of 
facilities to their cost, so that while taking full account of quality, risks, likely scope changes, 
utility and appearance, the cost of a project is planned to be within the economic limit of 
expenditure. This stage in a project life-cycle is particularly crucial as decisions made during 
the early stages of  the development process carry more far-reaching economic consequences 
than the relatively limited decisions which can be made later in the process. Despite the great 
importance of cost estimation, it is undeniably not simple, nor straightforward, because of the 
lack of information in the early stages of the project (Hegazy, 2002). To achieve accuracy, 
the estimator has to be able to predict the future- something even the best technologies 
available cannot achieve with certainty, for accurate reasoning is only possible in a world 
where information is complete and certain, and where cause and effect links are accurately 
known. Risk and uncertainty thus deeply pervade the construction industry, and continue to 
cause unending controversy and debate because, as (Baccarini, 2005) suggests, all too often 
risks are either ignored or dealt with in a completely arbitrary way using some rules of thumb 
or percentages. As Flanagan and Norman (1993) point out, the task of risk management or 
response in most cases is thus so poorly performed that far too much risk is passively 
retained, ultimately resulting in cost escalation during project delivery. 
Strategic Misrepresentation and Optimism Bias 
Some contemporary authorities on the subject of cost overrun have proposed more depressing 
explanations to the phenomenon. Flyvbjerg et al, suggest that overruns are chiefly due to 
‘strategic misrepresentations’, i.e. outright lying (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002) and ‘optimism bias’ 
(Flyvbjerg, 2007). Flyvbjerg et al. compared the cost of projects at the time of the decision to 
build to the cost at completion and found inaccuracies in cost forecasts for transportation 
infrastructure projects to be on average 44.7% for rail, 33.8% for bridges and tunnels, 20.4% 
for roads and concluded that 9 out of 10 projects outrun their cost targets. Overruns beyond 
100% of original cost are also not uncommon (Trost and Oberlander, 2003; Odeck, 2004).  
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In order to get the project approved, sponsors and estimators, especially on public works, 
tend to intentionally underestimate the true cost of the project in what has been described as 
the ‘Machiavelli factor’ (Flyvberg, 2003). ‘By routinely overestimating benefits and 
underestimating costs, promoters make their projects look good on paper, which helps get 
them approved and built’ (Flyvbjerg et al., 2005). It makes little reasoning to stop the project 
once a considerable amount of money has already been spent to get it started, he claims 
(Flyvbjerg et al., 2004). Wach (1989) was even more forthright in his paper ‘When planners 
lie with numbers’ and later advocated for better ethics in forecasting for public works 
(Wachs, 1990).  
If cost overruns cannot be explained by intentional underestimation, optimism bias might be a 
likely culprit according to Flyvbjerg (2007). Optimism bias can be explained as the cognitive 
disposition to evaluate future events in a fairer light than they might actually be in reality 
(Lovallo and Kahneman, 2003). Unlike strategic misrepresentation, this might not be born 
out of deceptive intent, but also often leads to underestimating true cost, overestimation of 
benefits and overlooking the potential of error and uncertainty. The potential gains of the 
project thus becomes overwhelmingly enticing, and almost blinding to likely pitfalls. It also 
leads to underestimating the full extent of certain risk events, should they occur.  
In effect, delusion and deception are complementary explanations of the failure of large 
infrastructure projects, causing works such as diverting existing utilities, environmental 
impacts and foreseeable risks to be continually underestimated in construction (Flyvbjerg, 
2009). This line of diagnosis of the problem of cost overrun might seem appealing, at least on 
first thought, especially in terms of large capital intensive public projects or those that are 
likely to make to make high political statements. Flyvbjerg’s far-reaching work on cost 
overruns led to the endorsement of his ‘Reference Class Forecasting’ by the American 
Planning Association in 2005 (cf. APA, 2005; Flyvbjerg, 2007). This will be discussed in 
more detail in later sections of the paper. 
Going beyond Strategic Misrepresentation and Optimism Bias 
Even though the deception and delusion might be plausible explanations for cost overruns, 
particularly in large publicly funded or politically motivated projects, they are not easily 
generalisable to all types of projects undertaken within the construction industry. 
Researchers, including Love (2012), rebut Flyvbjerg’s conclusions as simplistic, largely 
misleading and not an accurate reflection of reality. Love et al.’s rejoinder suggest a move 
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beyond optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation to focus on intermediary events, 
actions, the so-called ‘pathogens’ that occur between project inception and completion. At the 
core of Love’s argument is that many events and actions that are not accounted for in the 
initial estimates tend to drive up cost. This school of thought is largely supported by Aibinu 
and Pasco (2008), Odeck (2004) and Odeyinka et al (2012). Love’s case study of social 
infrastructure projects suggest that foul-play, as suggested by Flyvbjerg and Wach, might not 
be best explanations of cost overruns and that the fingers point at the events that occur before 
and during project delivery stage (Love et al., 2011). Besides, it is almost impossible to draw 
valid distinctions along a continuum of motivation when promoting a project from reasonable 
optimism, through over-enthusiasm, culpable error to deliberate deceit using statistical 
analysis, as adopted in the Flyvbjerg’s works.  
Research on leadership and governance on construction projects by Gil and Lundrigan 
(2012), provide perhaps a more holistic assessment of cost growth that aligns closely with the 
views of Love, et al above. Projects evolve, is essentially the core of their defence. Very 
often, construction projects change considerably in scope and design between conception, to 
inception and completion often due to a client’s proposed changes or technically imposed 
changes. This suggests that it might be erroneous to simply compare the cost of a project at 
inception, A, with the cost at completion, B, and wherever B>A, then overruns have occurred 
and estimators of A either lied or are incompetent- A and B are essentially very different. 
More robust explanations of overruns need to factor in process and product, as well as 
sources of changes to scope. For Love and Gil et al, project overruns are not really a case of 
projects not going according to plan (budget), but the other way round- plans not going 
according to project. 
Gil and Lundrigan propose a ‘relay race’ framework for understanding cost growth, 
particularly on mega projects such as the London Olympics Project, Scottish Parliament or 
Terminal 2 project at the Heathrow Airport, all of which seemed to have suffered the curse of 
cost growth, at least on a perfunctory examination. In the relay race of construction delivery, 
the baton of project leadership is passed on from one person(s) or organisation at the different 
stages of the project delivery. The aims and scope of the project, as well as skills and 
competencies of the project sponsors and promoters (project governors) at the conceptual 
stage of the project are often very different from their counterparts at the project design or 
delivery stage. Also, it is not unusual for most public projects to have long gestation periods, 
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stretching over several years, before final approval is reached, by which time project budget 
would also have changed a number of times. The Scottish Parliament Building is a paragon in 
this respect- the circa £40 million submitted by the Scottish Office as likely final cost did not 
take into consideration project location or the building of a completely new parliament 
building. It is no wonder the final cost of the project was 10 times this initial proposed cost 
(Fraser, 2004). 
Perception and Measuring Overruns 
Perhaps our perception of cost overruns needs to change altogether. What is described as cost 
overruns at the moment might not be overruns after all if reckoned through the eyes of 
different procurement routes, for examples. It is possibly one of the reasons why cost overrun 
is not often reported in projects procured through joint ventures or alliancing. Typically, in 
traditional contracting, design and estimates are first prepared by the Client’s Estimator (CE) 
and then bids are invited from contractors. The lowest bidder often wins the job with the 
lowest tender value becoming the cost estimate at the beginning of the project (A). The 
contractor undertakes then to deliver the project at cost, A, and all add-ons are dealt with 
through change orders or claims until project completion at cost, B. Whenever B>A, overruns 
are reported. It is easy to identify how competition, market conditions, optimism bias and the 
selection by lowest bidder combine to drive down the initial estimate, A, creating a somewhat 
unrealistic target as likely final cost. For the contractor therefore, winning work at the right 
price (realistic cost) becomes a very difficult task. To be thorough in estimation would mean 
including likely cost of most/all risk events in the tender, consequently pricing himself out of 
competition. Most contractors may therefore not include potential risk events in their tenders 
so as to increase their likelihood of winning the contract. This was evident in related studies 
in modelling final cost of construction projects (Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith, 2012). 
Some have suggested that the industry move beyond its fixation on measuring project success 
largely in terms of cost (Bassioni et al., 2004; Yeung et al., 2008). The CNBR debate was 
frequently punctuated by the question, ‘why care about cost overruns anyway? If projects run 
over budget but deliver what the client wants, shouldn’t everyone be happy?’ After all, cost 
overruns only represent our human inability to predict future events accurately, or identify 
risks and quantify their likely impact and cost. Others think perhaps there is a need for a 
paradigm shift in how projects are evaluated to cover a combination of social, economic, 
social, usability, value for money, etc. (Toor and Ogunlana, 2010). The Sydney Opera House 
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experienced large overruns at the time of construction but its now generally considered a 21st 
century icon of buildings and a popular destination for tourists and opera concerts. Similarly, 
in spite of the controversies about cost overruns, the Scottish Parliament Building has won 
several awards, including the coveted Stirling Award in 2005 by the Royal Institute of British 
Architects for its audacious, highly conceptual and iconic design. Even if cost should be a 
major factor for assessment, it certainly should not be a simplistic or statistical comparison 
between awarded contract sum and cost at final accounts.  
Cognition, Bias and Learning 
Can a science that combines intuition and analysis ever be precise or unbiased? A qualified 
‘no’ is probably the answer to that question, according to Kahneman and Tversky (1979), 
formulators of Prospect Theory- decision making under risk and uncertainty. The theory 
suggests people make decisions based on the likely gains, or loss, of a venture, and not 
necessarily based on the real outcome of the decision. It further proposes that decision 
making is often flawed by systematic biases and that error in judgement is often systematic 
and predictable, rather than random. Kahneman, a Noble Prize winner for his works on 
decision making and behavioural economics, delineates decision making and the illusion of 
understanding, stating that we often exhibit an excessive confidence in what we believe we 
know about any situation, and that our  inability to acknowledge the full extent of our 
ignorance and the uncertainty of the world we live in makes us prone to overestimate how 
much we understand (Kahneman, 2011). His work with Lovallo (2003) provides further 
defence of the Prospect Theory from different business areas. Kahneman’s theory holds 
profound extensions for decision making in the construction industry, especially for large 
public projects where the effects and cost of risk and uncertainty are particular heightened. It 
would also provide large support of Flyvbjerg’s arguments on strategic misrepresentation and 
optimism bias already discussed in this paper. Conceivably, this is one reason why it is easy 
to err on the side of optimism when promoting a project, or when estimating the outcome of a 
risk event.  
Perhaps even more controversial are the conclusions reached by Dunning and Kruger (2009), 
that incompetence does not only cause poor performance but also has the dual effect of 
robbing people of the ability to recognise poor performance. They posit that the 
metacognitive skills required to judge the accuracy of a decision is the same required to 
evaluate the error in the same decision- to lack the former, is to fall short in the latter as well 
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(Kruger and Dunning, 1999). The result thereof is that the ‘incompetent will tend to grossly 
overestimate their skills and abilities’ (Kruger and Dunning, 2009). They tied their 
conclusion to Darwin’s pronouncement- ‘ignorance more frequently begets confidence than 
does knowledge’ (Darwin, 1871), a theory largely supported by Ehrlinger et al. (2008) and 
Maki et al. (1994).  
Herein lies the estimation complex- a combination of optimism bias and prospect theory 
predisposes us to underestimate true cost, discounting the real effect of uncertainty and error 
while doing so. At the same time, Dunning-Kruger tendencies blind forecasters to the error in 
reaching unrealistic estimates for project cost. Juxtapose these with the effect of risk and 
uncertainty, competition embedded within the culture of lowest-bidder tendering, as well as 
strategic misrepresentation, and the overruns reported in Tables 1 and 2 become less 
surprising. It is easier to understand how most cost estimates can be prepared, or at least 
reported, with an unjustifiable confidence in their accuracy. If this is the case, then perhaps 
we might not have to move beyond optimism bias just yet, as suggested by Love (2011). If 
we are indeed systematically prone to err towards optimism bias in our reasoning, then it 
might be wise to rethink how that affects our estimates and what needs to be done about it.  
Flyvbjerg (2002) also noted that ‘no learning’ seemed to be taking place in the construction 
industry over the 70 years prior to his study, and that estimation accuracy has not seen much 
improvement even with the advancements in technology and the proliferation of cost models 
and project management approaches. Kruger and Dunning (2009), as well as Ehrlinger et al 
(2008) attribute lack of performance improvement to the lack of accurate and constructive 
feedback. They however observed that an awareness of limitations of skills and decision 
making within an environment of uncertainty, helped to improve performance and self-
calibration. A lack of learning in the construction industry could be explained in a number of 
ways- that the mitigating factors causing overruns are ones that the industry absolutely cannot 
overcome and therefore has to accept cost overruns as normal part of practice; or that there is 
simply very little incentive to reach realistic target inception; or further still that the industry 
seems to largely miss the opportunities offered by effective knowledge transfer and feedback 
from previously completed projects, as noted by Hartmann and Dorée (2013). How is explicit 
and tacit knowledge captured and utilised within the industry presently? How do project 
closure reports feed back into the development of new projects for continuous improvement?  
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RETHINKING OVERRUNS 
For the purposes of cost modelling or estimation, it is important to clarify an important point. 
Existing literature, and recent CNBR debate, on ‘cost overruns’ seems to conflate two related, 
but different issues- overruns and underestimation. Unfortunately, a lot of cost models do not 
make this distinction either and thus become limited in their application in practice. As 
already pointed out, most large publicly funded projects tend to go through a long gestation 
period after project conception during which many changes to scope and accompanying costs 
occur- sometimes the initial scheme bears little likeness to the defined project. The estimated 
cost at project inception often fails to take into consideration a lot of details and information, 
largely because much of these are not yet available or uncertain- the case of the initial circa 
£40 million estimate for the Scottish Parliament. For many large publicly funded projects, 
this is normally when project sponsors garner for project approval and funding. It is perhaps 
at this stage the effects of Prospect Theory, Dunning-Kruger effect, Optimism bias and 
strategic misrepresentation are particular heightened to keep cost at an attractive low and 
benefits of undertaking the project high. This might be what accounts for what the authors 
refer to as underestimation of likely cost- the difference between estimated cost at project 
inception and cost at the end of project definition phase in Error! Reference source not found..  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Overruns 
Time 
(Years) 
Inception 
Gestation 
Project Definition 
Project 
Construction 
Conception Phase Definition Phase Construction Phase 
Project 
Cost 
Underestimate 
Prospect Theory 
Strategic Misrepresentation 
Dunning-Kruger  
Optimism Bias 
Scope Changes 
Lack of information 
Scope Changes 
Ground Conditions 
Technical, Managerial 
Material Price Changes 
Estimation Error, etc 
Figure 1: Conceptual model for understanding cost growth on large public projects. 
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Overruns however, are aptly described as the difference in cost at project completion and 
project definition stage (see Error! Reference source not found.). This is usually as a result of 
further scope changes, normally not as significant as those at project definition stage, ground 
conditions, technical and managerial difficulties, material or labour price changes, estimation 
error, etc. This are the factors that Love et al (2011) describe as ‘pathogens’. So, whereas, 
Flyvberg’s work mainly deals with underestimation, Love’s explanations for cost growth 
largely covers the latter phases of the construction project. It is important to note however 
that Error! Reference source not found. is not necessarily wholly applicable for small, non-
political and routine projects where the effects of the political and cognitive causes of cost 
growth are less heightened. Much of the media hype on cost overruns however is often based 
on a comparison between cost at inception and cost at completion, almost ignoring the 
mediating phases of project gestation and definition.  
REFERENCE CLASS FORECASTING 
Flyvbjerg developed a practical method for forecasting cost of large projects based on 
Reference Class Forecasting (RCF) formulated by Kahneman and Tvesky (1979; 1994). RCF 
attempts to use ‘distributional information’ (knowledge) from previous projects similar to the 
new project being undertaken, the so-called taking of an ‘outside view’ of planned actions, 
based on actual past performance. Kahneman and Flyvbjerg reckon this approach might 
somehow help to bypass optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation in decision making 
(Flyvbjerg, 2007). The methodology involves three steps, summarised simply here as: 
a. Identify a reference class of past, similar projects.  
b. Estimate a probability distribution for the selected reference class, and 
c. Establish likely cost of the new project using the reference class distribution. 
The first instance of its application was on Edinburgh Tram project by the UK Government- 
the original forecast by the Transport Initiatives Edinburgh (tie), the project promoter was 
about £255 million but the RCF indicated this could rise up to £400 million and warned that 
the final cost could even be exceedingly higher (Flyvbjerg, 2007). Recent estimates now 
indicate that the final construction cost of the Trams could be around £776 million (Miller, 
2011; Railnews, 2012). The RCF has reportedly been applied to the £15 billion London 
Crossrail and £7.5 million Taunton Third Way projects in the UK (Flyvbjerg, 2007).  
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Even though RCF is still yet to be widely tested, or even adopted, it might be a good step in 
the right direction especially in dealing with the root causes of underestimation, (as opposed 
to cost overrun) as shown in Error! Reference source not found., i.e. optimism bias, Prospect 
Theory, Dunning-Kruger effect and strategic misrepresentation. However, as pointed out by 
Flyvbjerg, RCF is largely applicable to large, non-routine or one-off projects such as 
stadiums, museums, dams, etc.  On smaller, less political, or frequent projects however, a 
fairly similar but more established method of forecasting that employs previous experience 
and incremental learning is data mining. It has been extensively used in other industries 
including finance (Kovalerchuk and Vityaev, 2000), medicine (Bellazzi and Zupan, 2008; 
Koh and Tan, 2011) and business (Apte et al., 2002), but yet to see widespread application in 
the construction industry. Not withstanding, it has been applied to construction knowledge 
management (Yu and Lin, 2006), estimating the productivity of construction equipment 
(Yang et al., 2003), study of occupational injuries (Cheng et al., 2012a), alternative dispute 
resolution (Fan and Li, in press) and prediction of the compressive strength high performance 
concrete (Cheng et al., 2012b) in the construction industry. It has been used to develop final 
cost models in the next section of this paper, in a manner that addresses the overruns part of 
Error! Reference source not found..  
FINAL COST MODEL DEVELOPMENT USING DATA MINING 
Data mining is the analytic process for exploring large amounts of data in search of consistent 
patterns, correlations and/or systematic relationships between variables, and to then validate 
the findings by applying the detected patterns to new subsets of data (StatSoft Inc, 2008). 
Data mining attempts to scour databases to discover hidden patterns and relationships in 
order to find predictive information for business improvement. Similar to reference class 
forecasting, data mining starts with the selection of relevant data from a data warehouse that 
contains information on organisation and business transactions of the firm (Ngai et al., 2009). 
The selected data set is then pre-processed before actual data mining commences. Data pre-
processing typically involves steps such as sub-sampling, clustering, transformation, de-
noising, normalisation or feature extraction (StatSoft Inc., 2011)  to ensure that the data are 
structured and presented to the model in the most suitable way for effective modelling.  
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The next stage, as shown in Figure 2, involves the actual modelling, where one or a 
combination of data mining techniques is applied to scour down the dataset to extract useful 
knowledge. The results obtained are then evaluated and presented into some meaningful form 
to aid business decision making. This final step might involve graphical representation or 
visualisation of the model for easy communication. Artificial neural networks (ANN) is used 
for the modelling aspect of this paper mainly because of its learning and generalisation 
capabilities (Anderson, 1995). 
Data 
The data used for the models in this paper were supplied by an industry partner with its 
primary operation in the delivery of water infrastructure and utility in the UK. Approximately 
1600 projects completed between 2004 and 2012, with cost range of between £4000 - £15 
million, comprising newly built, upgrade, repair or refurbishment projects were used for the 
Model Deployment & 
Validation 
Data understanding 
& Pre-processing 
Organisational and 
Business Database 
 
Processed 
Data 
Model 
Results 
Actual Performance 
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 Target Data 
Knowledge 
Generated 
Business 
understanding 
Target data 
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Rule extraction 
Pattern identification 
Clustering 
Interpretation & 
Evaluation of models 
Feedback 
Figure 2: The generic data mining process 
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models reported in this paper. 15 project cases were selected using stratified random 
sampling to be used for independent testing of the final models. The remaining data were 
then split in an 80:20% ratio for training and testing of the models, respectively. 
Cost values were normalised to a 2012 baseline with base year 2000 using the infrastructure 
resources cost indices by the Building Cost Information Services (BCIS, 2012). Numerical 
predictors were further standardized to zScores using  
    
	


       Equation 1 
where:  zScore is the standardized value of a numerical input, xi 
  µ is the mean of the numerical predictor 
  σ is the standard deviation of the numerical predictor 
This allowed numerical inputs to be squashed into a smaller range of variability, potentially 
improving the numerical condition of the optimization process of the model (StatSoft Inc, 
2008). If one input has a range of 0 to 1, while another  has a range of 0 to 30 million, as was 
the case in the data that were used in this analysis, the neural net will expend most of its 
effort learning the second input to the possible exclusion of the first. All categorical variables 
were coded using a binary coding system. Data screening using scree test, factor analysis and 
optimal binning allowed for the selection of six initial predictors (primary purpose of project, 
project scope, project delivery partners, operating region, project duration, and initial 
estimated cost) to be used for the actual modelling using ANN. See Ahiaga-Dagbui and 
Smith (2013) for more details on the data, predictor selection and data pre-processing used in 
this paper. 
Model Development 
The final model was developed after an iterative process of fine-tuning the network 
parameters and/or inputs until acceptable error levels were achieved or when the model 
showed no further improvement. First, the automatic network search function of Statistica 10 
software was used to optimise the search for the best network parameters, after which 
customized networks were developed using the optimal parameters identified. 5 activation 
functions1 were used at this stage in both hidden and output layers, training 2000 multi-layer 
perceptron networks and retaining the 5 best for further analysis. The overall network 
                                                           
1 identity, logistic, tanh, exponential and sine activation functions 
Page 13 of 20 Journal of Financial Management of Property and Construction
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
performance was measured using the correlation coefficient between predicted and output 
values as well as the Sum of Squares (SOS) of errors. SOS is defined here as: 
  ∑  
 ……Equation 2 
Where   Oi is the predicted final cost of the ith data case (Output) 
  Ti is the actual final cost of the ith data case (Target). 
The higher the SOS value, the poorer the network at generalisation, whereas the higher the 
correlation coefficient, the better the network. The p-values of the correlation coefficients 
were also computed to measure their statistical significance. The higher the p-value, the less 
reliable the observed correlations. The retained networks are then validated using the 15 
separate projects that were selected using stratified sampling at the beginning of the 
modelling exercise. See Figure 3 for the overall performance of 7 of the retained networks. 
 
Figure 3: Performance of selected models 
  
 
[Table 2 here] 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the predictions and absolute percentage errors (APE) 
achieved by the best model (model 33). The average APE achieved by this model was 3.67% 
across the 15 validation cases. Its APEs ranged between 0.04% and 15.85%. It was observed 
that the worst performances of the model were achieved on projects with the smallest values 
in the validation set (cases 13 & 15). This might potentially be because a majority of the 
projects used for the model training had values in excess of £5 million. However, the actual 
monetary errors on these predictions were deemed satisfactory as they were relatively small 
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(about £3500 & £2500 for models 13 & 15 respectively). 87% of the validation predictions of 
the best model were within ±5% of the actual cost of the project. The authors are now 
exploring avenues of transforming the models into standalone desktop applications for 
deployment within the operations of the industry partner that collaborated in this research. 
CONCLUSION 
Cost estimate reliability and accuracy on construction projects continues to receive a lot of 
attention from both industry and academia. The industry is faced with a complex web of 
causes, which we propose fall into two distinct yet often conflated categories – cost 
underestimation and cost overrun: 
Underestimation: 
• Optimism Bias- a propensity to believe and act on a notion that all will go well 
leading to the underestimation the role of uncertainty in outcomes; 
• Prospect Theory- making decisions based on likely gains and loss rather than the 
actual outcome of the decision;  
• Strategic misrepresentation- outright lying and corruption; 
• Dunning-Kruger effect- the bend to overestimate competency or accuracy in 
judgement and the inability to see past our own errors; competition to win projects; 
Overrun: 
• Scope changes, whether mandated by circumstances or requested by client.  
• Managerial and technical difficulties. 
• Risk and uncertainty 
• Ground conditions, price changes, etc. 
Most of these, especially the cognitive and psychological factors, tend to work together to 
drive down the true cost of the project during the initial stages, creating a false and unreliable 
estimate as target to reach. We have attempted to provide a holistic view of the problem of 
cost growth, while presenting a conceptual model to distinguish between these often 
conflated ideas of underestimation and overruns on construction projects. Reference Class 
Forecasting was discussed as a possible means of addressing underestimation, particularly on 
large publicly funded projects. The development of a final cost prediction model using data 
mining and artificial neural networks was then presented as a possible avenue of addressing 
cost overruns in the construction industry. The best model achieved an average absolute 
percentage error of 3.67% with 87% of the validation predictions falling within an error range 
of ±5%. These methods can be used to develop decision support systems especially at early 
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stages of the construction project as well as complement traditional methods of estimation in 
order to reach more accurate and reliable cost estimates. 
Clients can play a crucial role in ensuring the quality and reliability of cost estimates in the 
construction industry. As indicated by the Commercial Manager of one the biggest 
construction companies in the UK, ‘winning a tender is easy. But winning at the right price is 
difficult.’ Unless clients start demanding realistic estimates, rather than the lowest estimates 
at the early stages of a project, the problem of cost overrun might remain with the industry for 
a long time to come. Cultural changes within the industry towards the search for realistic 
targets might incentivise contractors to flag up potential estimating pitfalls early-on.  
Questions about who has the responsibility on behalf of the client to govern the project 
always has profound implications on cost growth from inception to completion and needs to 
be addressed very early on a project. This is particularly important on mega projects such as 
the London 2012 Olympic Project or the Scottish Parliament (see the ‘Holyrood Enquiry’ 
(Fraser, 2004) and ‘Design by Deception’ (Flyvbjerg, 2005) for the interactions between 
project leadership, politics, and business and cost growth on the Scottish Parliament Building 
and Sydney Opera House respectively.  
Project knowledge capture and its utilisation would also be very crucial in tackling cost 
overruns. Some data mining techniques like neural networks are particular useful in 
modelling both explicit and tacit knowledge within extensive databases. This can be used to 
complement traditional cost estimation methods or RFC to reach more realistic and reliable 
estimates. Finally, and perhaps even more importantly, is the creation of a culture of critical 
questioning, measures of accountability, with checks and balances to make sure that cost is 
managed to be within reasonable budget limits. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Some Examples of Cost Growth in Construction Projects 
Project Estimated Cost Final Cost % Overrun 
Sydney Opera House AUD 7 AUD 102 1357 
Nat West Tower £15 £115 667 
Thames Barrier Project £23 £461 1904 
Scottish Parliament £195* £414 112 
British Library £142 £511 260 
*September 2000 estimate. Initially stated cost was about £40 million Source: Audit Scotland 
(2004) 
 
 
Table 2: Validation results of the best model (Model 33) 
Validation 
Case 
Actual Final Cost Final Cost 
predicted 
Model  Error Model Absolute 
% Error 
1 £     4,912,649 £        5,120,943 -£         208,294 4.24% 
2 £     1,617,225 £        1,617,805 -£                580 0.04% 
3 £   11,277,470 £      10,743,624 £         533,846 4.73% 
4 £     2,110,260 £        2,136,125 -£           25,865 1.23% 
5 £     5,398,965 £        5,425,142 -£           26,177 0.48% 
6 £        180,532 £           181,214 -£                681 0.38% 
7 £     2,572,564 £        2,530,178 £           42,386 1.65% 
8 £     1,440,593 £        1,372,864 £           67,729 4.70% 
9 £     3,842,258 £        3,793,851 £           48,407 1.26% 
10 £     4,194,219 £        4,131,285 £           62,934 1.50% 
11 £        375,170 £           387,731 -£           12,561 3.35% 
12 £          50,637 £            51,502 -£                865 1.71% 
13 £          24,479 £            22,017 £             2,462 10.06% 
14 £        858,112 £           824,334 £           33,779 3.94% 
15 £          21,798 £            18,344 £             3,454 15.85% 
Average Absolute % Error 3.67% 
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